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In this paper we use Household Budget Survey data to analyze the evolution of the 
household credit market in the Czech Republic over the period 2000–2008. While the 
share of households that borrow remained stable and below 40%, the amount of debt 
outstanding increased. We estimate a series of models of the determinants of borrowing. 
We next merge our data with the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions in 2005–
2008, which contain direct information on repayment behavior, in order to test the 
validity of the standard debt burden measure as a predictor of default. We propose an 
alternative indicator – the adjusted debt burden (ADB), defined as the ratio of loan 
repayments to discretionary income, constructed as net income minus the living minimum 
(the minimum cost of living for a given household composition as set by the Czech 
Statistical Office), which turns out to be a superior predictor of default risk. Limited by 
the data, we use a fairly broad concept of default, namely, the inability to make loan 
repayments on time. Based on the distribution of default risk across the levels of the 
adjusted debt burden, we suggest that a 30% ADB threshold should be used as the 
definition of overindebtedness, with an average default risk of 17%. Finally, we show that 
overindebtedness and local economic shocks are closely related, suggesting that default 
risk should be always considered in the context of regional economic conditions. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Household credit markets are often characterized by aggregate indicators such as the total amount 
of credit or the average debt burden in the population. Previous studies show that using household 
level microdata to analyze household credit markets provides additional information, such as the 
distribution of the debt burden among households that borrow, which is crucial for financial 
stability measures. In this paper we use Czech household-level data to analyze the evolution of 
the household credit market in the Czech Republic over the period 2000–2008. In the first part of 
the analysis, which is based on Czech Household Budget Survey data, we find that the percentage 
of households with at least one loan was just below 40% and remained stable over the given 
period, whereas the average amount of debt outstanding among households with a loan increased. 
The average debt burden among households that borrow increased from 7% to almost 11% over 
the last decade. The level rose in particular for young households with higher income levels, 
mainly as a consequence of expansion of the housing loan market. In addition, we propose an 
alternative definition of debt burden, the so-called adjusted debt burden (ADB), which takes into 
account the variation in the costs of living across households of different size and composition. 
We further augment our analysis with a complementary dataset, the Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions for 2005–2008, which contains information on repayment behavior. Based on 
the only information available in our data, we define default in a very broad way, namely, as the 
inability to make loan repayments on time. We explore the relationship between the level of the 
debt burden and the occurrence of delayed repayments and identify the data-driven cut-off point 
above which default is likely. We compare the predictive power of the standard and adjusted debt 
burdens and show that the ADB is correlated twice as strongly with the default rate as the 
standard debt burden indicator. As for the cut-off points serving as overindebtedness indicators, 
we find that households with a standard debt burden above 15% and with an adjusted debt burden 
above 30% are substantially more likely to have repayment difficulties and to default on their 
payments. Given the higher predictive power of the ADB, we propose that an ADB cut-off point 
of 30% be used as an indicator of households’ overindebtedness. The average default rate of 
households with an ADB of above 30% is 17% on average over the period studied. Based on our 
findings, using our sample to represent the whole economy, we estimate that 7% of total 
repayments and 6% of total new loans in 2007 were at risk of default. 
Finally, we show that there is substantial regional variation in borrowing patterns in the Czech 
Republic. The share of households that borrow ranges from 25% to almost twice as much across 
regions, and the share of overindebted households (with ADBs above 30%) ranges from 4.3% to 
16.5%. The median ADB among households with a loan ranges from 10.2% to 21.1% in 2008. It 
turns out that regions with a higher share of households with a loan also have a greater degree of 
overindebtedness. Moreover, these are regions with worse local economic conditions, in 
particular higher unemployment, as well as regions that face the highest risk of negative 
economic shocks. We conclude that it is these regions which have the greatest impact on the 




The most frequently used measures of household borrowing are based on aggregate data and 
aggregate indicators, such as the total amount of credit extended to households or the average 
debt burden for the whole population. However, only household-level analysis using micro data 
can reveal the actual concentration of debt in the population and can help identify households that 
are overindebted and whose repayment ability is the most likely to be affected by negative 
economic shocks, which is crucial for the evaluation of default risk and for financial stability 
analysis. Only a very few papers, such as Zochowski and Zajaczkowski (2006) and Faruqui 
(2008), who use Polish and Canadian household budget surveys, respectively, inspect household 
indebtedness at the micro level and present the distribution of the debt burden in a population. 
Furthermore, in the same country context as our analysis, Jakubik and Schmieder (2008) show 
that aggregate default models work reasonably well for the corporate sector but usually fail to 
explain household sector default, suggesting again that aggregate measures of household debt are 
not sufficient.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the evolution of the household credit market in the Czech 
Republic over the last decade and to assess its default risks. Following the single-country studies 
mentioned above, this paper is the first to use Czech household-level data on borrowing and 
default to complement the existing aggregate figures of the Czech household credit market.
1 The 
first part of the analysis is based on data from the Czech Household Budget Survey (HBS), an 
annual cross-sectional survey conducted by the Czech Statistical Office, over the period 2000–
2008. We analyze the evolution of different types of household loans and identify the key 
determinants of household borrowing. While the percentage of households with at least one loan 
remained rather stable and below 40% over the given period, the composition of household credit 
by types of loans changed as the credit market for housing loans expanded relative to the market 
for consumer loans. The average size of new loans increased over the period analyzed, with a 
sharp rise during the housing market boom in 2007 and a drop during the financial crisis in 2008. 
We estimate a series of probit and tobit regressions of the determinants of a household’s 
probability of having a loan, its probability of taking out a new loan, the amount of the new loans 
taken out, and the level of the debt burden. The typical household that borrows the most has 
young members who are employees, have higher income, have children, live in a city, and have 
been married for a shorter period of time. They are also less risk averse and have experience with 
financial products. 
As the share of households that borrow remained stable, the expansion of the credit market 
through growth in the size of loans points to gradual debt accumulation among households. On 
average, about 18% of households with an existing loan are granted a new loan each year. Having 
an existing loan is also an important positive determinant of getting a new loan in our regression 
analysis, in particular for the years after the credit bureau was established and information-
sharing started to be used in the Czech Republic. As loan accumulation increases households’ 
degree of indebtedness, we analyze the level, distribution, and determinants of the debt burden of 
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households using the standard definition of the debt burden
2 (DB), i.e., the ratio of annual loan 
repayments to annual net income. The distribution of the debt burden among households that 
borrow moved towards higher levels over the analyzed period, starting with the majority of 
households concentrated below the level of 10% in 2000, with a median equal to 4.5%, to almost 
half of the population crossing this level in 2008, with a median debt burden of about 9%. The 
level rose in particular among young households with higher income levels, pointing to expansion 
of the housing loan market as being the main source of the increase of the debt burden. In 
addition, we propose an alternative definition of debt burden, the so-called adjusted debt burden 
(ADB), which takes into account the variation in the costs of living across households of different 
size and composition. Specifically, we define the ADB as the ratio of yearly loan repayments to 
discretional yearly income, constructed as net income minus the household-type-specific living 
minimum as set by the Czech Statistical Office. Similar to the DB measure, the median ADB also 
increased over the analyzed period, starting at 9.3% in 2000 and ending at 14% in 2008.  
Besides describing the households that borrow and the rising level of their debt burden, we 
augment our analysis with a complementary dataset – the Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) – for the period 2005–2008, with information on households’ repayment 
difficulties and delayed payments. Based on the only information available in our data, we define 
default as the inability to make loan repayments on time. This is our definition of default 
throughout this paper. As only a fraction of households with delayed payments eventually default 
on their loan obligations, our measure of the default risk is very conservative.  
As a debt burden above a certain ad-hoc level, such as 40 or 50%, is often used as a measure of a 
household’s overindebtedness and a signal of default (see, for example, Willeke, 2009), we 
explore the correlation between our two debt burden measures and the occurrence of delayed 
repayments in order to compare their predictive power and identify the data-driven cut-off point 
above which default is likely. As the HBS data includes detailed information on borrowing but no 
information about default, and the SILC data contains the opposite, we use the HBS data to 
estimate a model of loan repayments based on households’ socio-economic characteristics and 
income (present in both datasets) and use this model to predict loan repayments in the SILC data. 
With the predicted annual loan repayments and the actual annual net income, we construct the 
debt burden measure for each household in the SILC data and analyze the relationship between 
the debt burden and default. We find that the relationship is not strong enough to make the 
standard debt burden definition a satisfactory indicator of the risk of default.  
We show that the ADB is correlated twice as strongly with the default rate as the standard DB 
indicator. Furthermore, we find that households with a DB above 15% and with a ADB above 
30% are substantially more likely to default on their payments, which is why we propose these 
two levels as the cut-off points for overindebtedness, corresponding to an average default risk of 
10% and 14% in 2008. Based on our definition of overindebtedness, and reweighting the HBS 
data to represent the whole population, we conclude that overindebted households accounted for 
about 40% of repayments made and 33% of new loans taken out in 2007. This corresponds to 7% 
of total repayments and 6% of total new loans in 2007 being at risk of default. 
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Finally, as one of the first microdata studies of the household credit market, we explore regional 
differences in household borrowing.
3 We find that the share of households that borrow and their 
indebtedness vary substantially across regions in the Czech Republic and are positively correlated 
with each other as well as with local economic conditions, in particular unemployment. The 
degree of indebtedness and default across regions are also strongly positively correlated and 
confirm the validity of the ADB as a signal of default also at the regional level. We also show 
that the negative impact of the 2008 financial crisis in 2009 was bigger in regions with a higher 
initial share of overindebted households in 2008.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the literature and the key 
measures of household indebtedness, including our proposed ADB measure. The section which 
follows describes the evolution of the household credit market in the Czech Republic over the last 
decade at the aggregate level and using household level data. The fourth section presents our 
estimation results from the analysis of the determinants of household borrowing. The fifth section 
focuses on the repayment behavior of households; we compare the standard debt burden and the 
proposed ADB measure, identify an ADB threshold of 30% as a signal of overindebtedness, and 
simulate the share of overindebted households in loan repayments and new loans. The sixth 
section focuses on regional differences in borrowing and overindebtedness and their relation to 
the regional variation of economic shocks. The last section concludes. Additional estimation 
outputs, data details, and prediction evaluations are included in the Appendix.   
2. Literature Review and Key Concepts 
2.1 Previous Research 
Default in the household credit market is typically a consequence of negative macroeconomic 
shocks, such as a reduction in income or job loss. Households that have accumulated a higher 
amount of debt relative to their regular income sources are more likely to be unable to repay their 
loans. This is why a measure of household indebtedness is a crucial indicator for the prediction of 
default. Jappelli et al. (2008) show that household default is more sensitive to macroeconomic 
shocks in countries with higher household indebtedness, but that the sensitivity also depends on 
institutional factors. 
Most empirical research into household borrowing focuses on the question of whether household 
debt has grown so much as to impede households’ ability to service their debt and therefore 
constitutes a threat to financial stability. For example, Girouard et al. (2006) analyze household 
debt in several OECD countries between 1980 and 2005 and conclude that the rise in household 
borrowing can be mainly attributed to favorable economic conditions and the boom in the 
housing market. They also inspect the distribution of debt across different income levels and find 
that most of the debt was accumulated by higher-income households, for whom servicing the debt 
is relatively easy.  
The most popular measures of the household debt burden are the ratios of household debt to 
GDP, household debt to disposable income (net of taxes), household debt service (total loan 
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repayments) to disposable income, and household debt to financial assets, as well as the 
household delinquency rate and the personal bankruptcy rate. Garner (1996) provides an 
overview of several of these aggregate indicators and assesses their ability to predict the 
economic slowdown in the U.S. over the period 1961–1996. These measures are often either 
based on aggregate-level data or averaged over the population.  
However, as mentioned in the introduction, such indicators cannot capture the concentration of 
debt among households. For example, the average debt service burden ratio for the whole 
population is jointly determined by the share of households with outstanding debt and the amount 
of the loan repayments of households with outstanding debt. It is crucial for financial stability 
concerns, as well as for monetary policy, to disentangle these two factors that jointly determine 
the reported average debt burden.
4 The use of microdata is therefore crucial for the analysis of 
household indebtedness, as it can provide measures of debt concentration and, in particular, 
reveal the distribution of the debt burden among households in the population. The most popular 
indicator in the few microdata studies available is the ratio of loan repayments to disposable 
income, i.e., what we call – and use in this paper as – the debt burden indicator. See, for example, 
Faruqui (2008), Hellebrandt et al. (2008), Girouard et al. (2006), or Zochowski and Zajaczkowski 
(2006).  
Dynan et al. (2003) propose an alternative measure to what we call the debt burden – the so-
called financial obligations ratio, which adds recurring obligations to total loan repayments in the 
numerator of the debt burden. The debt burden is then the ratio of the total financial obligations 
of a household, including both loan repayments and recurring fixed obligatory expenses such as 
rent, auto leases, homeowners’ insurance, and property taxes, to disposable income. This measure 
is, in its logic, the closest measure to our ADB indicator that we found in the literature. 
Specifically, it is similar in that it also takes into account other household expenses. In this case, 
however, the expenses are those which households are obliged to pay regularly to other parties, 
whereas in our definition they are those which households necessarily incur in order to maintain 
some minimum standard of living.  
2.2 Key Concepts – Debt Burden Measures 
It is important to clarify the terminology. Debt burden is sometimes defined as the ratio of total 
debt to disposable income (income net of taxes), whereas the ratio of repayments to disposable 
income is called the debt service burden. However, according to the dictionary definitions, the 
debt burden is the cost of servicing debt. It follows that the debt burden ratio is the ratio of the 
debt burden to disposable income, which is the definition we use throughout this paper, although 
for brevity we drop the word “ratio” and refer to the concept as the debt burden. 
In our analysis, we first use this standard definition of debt burden (DB), specifically in our data 
the ratio of the annual amount of loan repayments in the given year to household disposable 
annual income. We then propose an alternative measure, the adjusted debt burden (ADB), which 
as the denominator uses households’ “true” discretionary income rather than disposable income, 
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taking into account the household’s minimum necessary expenses. We construct the adjusted debt 
burden as the ratio of the amount of loan repayments in the given year to annual household 
income net of the household-type-specific living minimum. The living minimum is the minimum 
annual expenditure of a household of a given size and composition, as set by the Czech Statistical 
Office.
5 While the DB tells us what proportion of annual income a household uses to service its 
debt, the ADB tells us the proportion of discretionary annual income a household pays out in loan 
repayments.  
The DB is calculated in exactly the same way for households of all sizes and compositions, 
regardless of the fact that discretionary income, i.e., income available for loan repayments in the 
event of financial distress, varies substantially across different household sizes. Consider two 
different households – one a single-member household who works and the other a household with 
one working adult, one adult not working, and two children. It may well be the case that the two 
households have the same total annual loan repayments and the same total disposable income. In 
the event of financial distress (say as a result of a negative economic shock), the first household 
can use for loan repayments all income up to the minimum expenditure necessary for one person, 
whereas the second household is left with a smaller amount of income after subtracting the 
minimum necessary for its four members. The two household types have identical DBs, but the 
second household is likely to encounter repayment difficulties at much lower DB levels than the 
first household. The DB measure does not reflect the difference in the default risk between these 
two households, while the ADB measure does. The ADB of the second household is much higher 
than that of the first, given the higher minimum expenditure of the four-member household 
compared to the one-member household. Furthermore, in terms of the evolution of indebtedness 
over time, the DB – in contrast to the ADB – does not capture the effect of the evolution of prices 
if it differs from that of household income.  
In this sense, the ADB is a preferable measure for comparing a household’s ability to service debt 
over time. For example, if prices go up but disposable income stagnates, the ability of a 
household to service debt diminishes. This is correctly captured by a rise in the ADB, in contrast 
to the DB, which does not change in this scenario. Thus, the ADB can well explain higher default 
rates and consequently possible threats to financial stability in periods of recession, when growth 
in the total debt decreases. This scenario is illustrated, for example, in Hellebrandt et al. (2008), 
where the authors report that although the distribution of debt did not change much in Britain in 
2008, the average household found it more difficult to service its existing debt due to higher 
prices and consequently lower discretionary income. As we show later in this paper, the ADB 
turns out to be a better predictor of default than the DB in the cross-sectional dimension as well. 
On the other hand, the DB requires only two pieces of information: total loan repayments and 
income net of taxes, which are typically available and well defined for international comparison 
purposes. The ADB, however, requires additional information about the minimum costs that the 
household incurs to decently survive. The currently used living minimum is only the first step 
towards a possibly refined concept of minimum costs. It varies only by household size and 
composition, which is already an improvement over the DB, which does not take into account 
even this minimum source of heterogeneity across households. However, the costs of living vary 
also with other characteristics, such as home-ownership status and region of residence. 
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Interestingly, Beck et al. (2010), who use SILC data for a number of old and new EU member 
states to analyze the determinants of access to mortgages, also compare the self-reported financial 
distress and vulnerability of mortgage owners versus renters and outright owners and find no 
difference between these groups.  
While we expect that using a refined measure of household costs in the ADB calculation will 
further increase the predictive power of the ADB, the downside, on the other hand, is the need to 
correctly measure the additional information on minimum expenditures and their comparability 
across households. Unless it is well and simply defined, such a refined ADB concept is likely to 
have limited application outside the national environment and common institutional settings (such 
as rent regulations). The development of an adequate but easily implementable concept of 
household costs for ADB calculations at the international level is a subject for future research. 
 
3. Household Credit Market Trends 
3.1 Aggregate Perspective 
Household debt in the Czech Republic has grown substantially in the last several years (see 
Figure 3.1). On the aggregate level, the loans-to-GDP ratio reached 31% in 2009.
6 Household 
indebtedness as measured by the ratio of loans to gross disposable income averaged across all 
households in the population also increased, reaching 56% in 2009. Since the escalation of the 
global financial and economic crisis, annual growth in loans to households has slowed 
significantly, reflecting changes in both demand and supply side factors. On the other hand, the 
ratios of debt to GDP and to gross disposable income have continued to increase owing to the fall 
in economic activity and the deterioration in the labor market. 
Relatively low interest rates have kept the increase in household debt service contained, despite 
the rise in indebtedness. However, the average debt (service) burden in the whole population has 
increased over the period analyzed, reaching (on loans from banking institutions) around 3%.
7 
This reflects the past evolution of interest rates on loans and the long-term rise in households’ 
debt.  
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Figure 3.1: Ratios of Household Debt to Gross Disposable Income and 
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Note:  Debt is the total household debt to banking institutions between 2000 and 2005. Household debt to 
non-banking institutions is also included since 2006. The interest burden pertains to loans from 
banking institutions only. 
Source: CNB.  
 
The previous acceleration of credit growth in the Czech Republic raises the question of whether 
the loan growth rate in Czech Republic was excessive or not. A comparison of the situation in the 
Czech Republic with that in other EU and CEE countries (see Figure 3.2) reveals that the loans-
to-GDP ratio in the Czech Republic is lower than that in the euro area
8 and is broadly comparable 
to that in other countries of the Central European region. However, it is likely that private sector 
indebtedness in the Czech Republic is still below its long-term equilibrium level.  
 







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
CZ HU PL SL SK
Source: CNB 
                                                           
8 The higher indebtedness in the euro area might also be due to the excess debt in some European countries (for 
example Portugal). 10   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
The aggregate evolution of the economy and household loans in terms of growth rates and base 
interest rates are documented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Various factors account for the household 
credit market growth (and in particular the growth in housing loans), which peaked in 2005 and 
2007: decreasing interest rates on loans, income and population growth, and past deregulation and 
liberalization, which broadened the range of both mortgage loan suppliers and loan products.
9 
However, the severe recession following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 put 
the financial position of households under considerable strain; the credit conditions tightened and 
many homeowners saw their housing equity eroded. While GDP and gross disposable income 
increased over much of the analyzed period, the trend reversed in 2007 and the two values 
dropped in 2009. Unemployment was steadily decreasing until 2008 but then rose significantly as 
a consequence of the financial crisis.  
 
Figure 3.3: Loans, Income and 
Unemployment Rate (Real Annual 
Growth, %) 
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The non-performing loans ratio among households decreased until 2008, reflecting strong economic 
and labor market growth (see Figure 3.5). The default rate was lowest for housing loans and highest 
for consumer loans from banking institutions.
10 This was connected mainly with the fact that 
housing loans are usually provided to higher-income households, while consumer credit is drawn 
mostly by lower-income households. Since 2009 the escalating global financial and economic crises 
has worsened the ability of households to repay debt. The recent global financial crises has 
highlighted the importance of understanding how households respond to various macroeconomic 
shocks, and whether and how this reaction depends on their income, demographics, and level of 
                                                           
9 Another factor supporting the probability of providing new client loans from banks’ point of view was the 
establishment of the Czech Banking Credit Bureau. The basic purpose of the bureau is to allow banks and 
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and credibility of their clients.  
10 Note that consumer loans from banking institutions correspond to what we call other loans in the microdata 
analysis. Figures for the non-performing ratio of consumer loans from non-banking institutions (hereinafter 




















3.2 Household-Level Data 
In order to document the credit market trends at the household level, we use data from the Czech 
Household Budget Survey (HBS), an annual cross-sectional survey conducted by the Czech 
Statistical Office (CZSO), over the period 2000–2008. It contains information about household 
budget items and a range of socio-economic information about the household and its members, 
but most importantly it includes several questions about household credit. First, we know whether 
a household has a loan and, if it does, what type. Second, while we do not observe any amounts 
of loans outstanding, we know the total amount of loan repayments a household made in a given 
year, broken down by three types of loans (see below). Third, we know the amount of new loans 
taken out by a household in a given year, again broken down by three types of loans. 
A household can have any of the following three types of loans: housing loans, consumer loans, 
and other loans. These loans are representative of three separate credit markets: 1) the housing 
credit market, represented by mortgages (with 50%–100% LTV) and construction saving loans 
(with 40%–100% LTV); note that construction loans are much more frequent among households 
than mortgages, and about one-tenth smaller in size; 2) the consumer credit market, represented 
by installment loans from non-banking institutions for purchases of durable goods; 3) the credit 
market for other types of loans, represented by overdrafts, credit cards, and unsecured consumer 
loans from banks. 
Table 3.6: Size of the Selected Samples from Household Budget Surveys  
YEAR  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 ALL 
Sample  2,994 3,045 3,038 2,760 2,883 2,877 2,752 2,765 2,685 25,799 
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Based on this information, we are able to construct the following variables for any type of loan or 
for one of the three types: 
-  whether the household has at least one loan,  
-  whether the household was granted at least one new loan in a given year, 
-  the total amount of new loans granted in a given year, 
-  the total amount of loan repayments in a given year.  
 
A household is defined as having a loan if it has either any loan repayments or any new loans 
granted in a given year. Having a new loan is defined based on a positive amount of new loans 
granted. Having an old loan is based on a positive amount of loan repayments. As the observed 
repayments in a given year may already be going toward a new loan taken out that year, our 
definition of having an old loan may overstate the share of households that have a loan from the 
previous year.  
Households can report to the CZSO over a time period of 1–12 months. For the purposes of our 
research, we used only households which report a whole 12-month financial history in order to 
give all households the same chance to get a new loan and evaluate their yearly repayments.  
The data sample for each year represents 0.01% of all households in the population. All the 
descriptive tables and figures use sampling weights to ensure representativeness. The survey 
interviews are remunerated and the non-response is minimal in this data, so no information is 
imputed by the data provider. The original data is augmented with a supplementary sample of 
very-low-income households in order to ensure sufficient frequency of such households in the 
data. In our analysis, we omit this special focus group of observations, identified as households 
with zero sampling weights, from our analysis. The final sample size of our data set is given in 
Table 3.6. 
3.3 Trends in Borrowing 
The share of households with a loan was highest in 2000, when almost 39% of households had 
some type of loan (see Figure 3.7). Afterwards, this number steadily decreased, eventually 
reaching 36% in 2005. We can observe an increase between 2006 and 2007, when the economy 
was growing. The sharp decrease to 33% in 2008 was due to the financial crisis, when a 
deterioration of the labor market reduced households’ demand for credit and mistrust among 
banks negatively affected supply. While the share of households with a loan was relatively stable 
over the period, the composition by types of loan changed substantially.  
The housing loan market was growing over the entire period starting in 2000. While in 2000 only 
14% of households had a housing loan, in 2008 the figure was 21%. The share of households with 
a housing loan increased even in 2008, the year of the crisis, when the other two markets 
dropped. In contrast to the housing loans market, the consumer loans market shrank significantly 
over the studied period. At the beginning of 2000, around 25% of households had a consumer 
loan. The figure had decreased by 10 percentage points by 2008. However, the amount of 
consumer loans granted rose, suggesting that loan accumulation occurred in the consumer loan 
market. The market for other loans grew between 2002 and 2004, but then remained stable until 
2007, when a sharp decrease followed. On average, 16% of households had another loan type 
over the studied period. When we sum the numbers at the end of 2008, we can see that they add   Who Borrows and Who May Not Repay?   13 
 
 
up to 50%. This is because one household can have multiple loans. From this we can conclude 
that at least 15% of households have multiple loans.  
Figure 3.7: Share of Households with a Loan over Time 
 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. Shares are in %.  
 
It is interesting to investigate the crowding-out among the three types of loans also from the 
perspective of the composition of loans by type. In 2000, among households that borrowed, 35% 
had another loan, 38% had a housing loan, and 66% had a consumer loan.
11 Corresponding to the 
borrowing patterns in Figure 3.7, there was a substantial increase in the share of housing loans to 
63% and a significant decrease in consumer loans to 35% in 2008, i.e., the same as the proportion 
of households with other loans.  
We now investigate the evolution of the share of households that take out a new loan, both 
overall and separately by type of loan (see Figure 3.8). The share of households with new loans 
dropped in 2003 but increased again to 13%. It remained fairly stable until 2007, but decreased to 
11% in 2008 in response to the beginning of the financial crisis. The housing loan market 
expanded as from 2004, peaking in 2007, when 2.4% of households took out a new housing loan. 
In 2008, the growth slowed, as the share of households with a new housing loan dropped by 
almost one-fifth compared to 2007. The consumer loans market was shrinking from 2000 until 
2004, when there was sudden growth and almost 6% of households took out a new consumer 
loan. From then on, the market decreased again, down to 4% in 2008. The biggest growth in the 
market for other loans occurred in 2004, when 13% of households took out a new loan. The 
growth continued until 2006 and was followed by a decrease in 2007 and 2008, when only about 
6% of households took out a new consumer loan.  
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Figure 3.8: Share of Households with a New Loan 
 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. Shares are in %. 
 
There are several plausible explanations for the growth in all types of loans in 2004. The first is 
increasing competition among lending institutions, which introduced more attractive products and 
more aggressive campaigns. The second factor is that information-sharing through external 
registers started to function fully in mid-2003. This may have contributed to better risk 
management and higher loan profitability, thereby creating room for expansion. The third factor 
is increasing demand for credit fostered by a rise in disposable income in 2004.  
Further, we explore the evolution of the size of the total new loans granted (see Figure 3.9). Over 
time, the household credit market has grown substantially in volume. In 2002, the average newly 
granted loan was around CZK 40,000. As information-sharing and credit-scoring came into use in 
2003, leading to better risk management and lower default risk, banks were willing to offer more 
loans with higher limits. At the same time, strong economic growth increased the demand for 
loans of bigger size. The average amount of new loans had doubled by 2005. This was followed 
by a further increase in 2007, fostered mainly by housing market growth. The average size of 
total new housing loans taken out by individual households was almost CZK 300,000 in 2005, 
and grew substantially to CZK 500,000 in 2007.
12 The expansion of both the housing market and 
the mortgage market accelerated in 2007, when an effective increase in taxes on construction 
work with effect from the beginning of 2008 was announced, resulting in an additional rise in the 
demand for housing. The credit market responded with an increase in the supply of mortgages, in 
terms of easier access and higher amounts. The average amount of total new consumer loans 
granted to households peaked in 2003, when it reached CZK 35,000. It then dropped for four 
years and rose again to CZK 30,000 in 2008. While the data suggest that loan accumulation takes 
place mostly through this market, the total amount of consumer loans obtained by households 
annually is rather small. The average amount of all new loans households are granted in the credit 
market for other loans has been constantly on the increase since 2000, reaching an average 
amount of CZK 40,000 in 2007. The maximum repayment period for unsecured consumer loans 
from banks (which are included among other loans in our classification) was extended from 5 to 7 
                                                           
12 The relatively low amount for a housing loan is driven by the fact that construction loans (of much smaller 
size) are included among housing loans and are typically much more widely used than mortgages.   Who Borrows and Who May Not Repay?   15 
 
 
years, an unusually long period compared to retail credit markets in other countries. The 
prolongation of the repayment period may have led to higher granted amounts, although it 
probably also increased the credit risk of the loans. While the median of the size of total newly 
granted loans, depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 3.9, evolved in a very similar way to the 
average, there is a difference in 2008, when only the median of housing loans declined, while the 
median of the other two types of loans, as well as the median when all loans are considered, 
actually increased further.  
Figure 3.9: Average (Left-Hand Panel) and Median (Right-Hand Panel) Size of Newly 
Granted Loans 
 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. The housing loan scale is on the y-axis on the right. 
 
The average number of loans a household has is another important feature of indebtedness. 
While, unfortunately, we do not have this information in our data, observing whether a household 
has loans of different types enables us to explore the number of types of loans (but not the 
number of loans of the same type). Over time, the average number of different loan types in our 
data set increased, reaching an average of 1.41 for the three loan types among households with a 
loan in 2008. As for the composition, 65% of households had no loan, 23% had one type of loan, 
10% had two types, and 2% had three types in 2008. Focusing only on households that borrow, 
66% had one type of loan, 28% had two loan types, and 6% had three loan types in 2008. 
3.4 Trends in Credit Accumulation  
We next analyze to what extent households accumulate debt. Using micro data allows us to ask 
whether the stable annual share of households that borrowed over the analyzed period consisted 
always of new households that took out a new loan, or rather of the same households that re-
borrowed. While we do not have panel data to address this question fully, we use the information 
about old loans and new loans to explore the degree of loan accumulation. Table 3.10 shows the 
share of households with a new loan among households that have an old loan, and looking 
backward, from the opposite perspective, the share of households with a new loan who also have 
an old loan. Among the households that had an old loan, 17.8% took out a new loan in 2008. 
Thus, almost one-fifth of households with an existing loan accumulated debt by taking out 
another loan. Looking at debt accumulation from the perspective of new loan borrowers, among 16   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
households that took out a new loan in 2008, 50.6% had an old loan. Therefore, half of the 
growth in the credit market was driven by households that had an existing loan.  
 
Table 3.10: Loan Accumulation Patterns 
 
   OLD 
LOAN=1 
NEW LOAN=1 
Year new_loan  old_loan 
2000 21.24%  43.09% 
2001 15.39%  36.18% 
2002 17.57%  43.02% 
2003 17.48%  45.85% 
2004 19.71%  44.83% 
2005 18.73%  43.21% 
2006 18.62%  44.72% 
2007 18.89%  46.81% 
2008 17.77%  50.55% 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. 
 
3.5 Debt Burden and Adjusted Debt Burden  
Figure 3.11 documents the evolution of the two debt burden measures, the DB and the ADB, as 
defined in section 2. Overall, the debt burden rose over the analyzed period. The median debt 
burden almost doubled, starting at 4.5% in 2000 and ending at 8.8% in 2008. The median ADB 
increased from 9.3% to 14% over the analyzed period. The average DB and ADB grew from 
7.3% to 12% and from 16.7% to 19.2%, respectively. We can also see that the debt burden 
increased sharply in 2005, the year of the household credit market boom, followed by a slight 
decrease in 2006. Subsequently, the debt burden grew again, albeit at a slower pace. The rise in 
the debt burden measures suggests that total loan repayments have increased relative to income, 
which has also grown since 2000, even in real terms. We expect both the rise in the amount of 
new loans and loan accumulation, as documented in previous subsections, to have contributed to 
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Figure 3.11: Evolution of the Average and Median DB and ADB over Time 
 
 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. 
 
We next explore the distribution of the debt burden measures in the population of households that 
borrow. Figure 3.12 shows the distribution of the DB and the ADB among households that 
borrow, comparing the years 2000 and 2008. For both measures, the distribution gradually moved 
towards higher levels over the analyzed period, but for the DB the change was greater. While a 
majority of households were concentrated below the 10% level in 2000, almost half of the 
population had moved above this level by 2008. 
Figure 3.12: Changes in the Distribution of the Debt Burden and Adjusted Debt Burden 
Note: Kernel densities of the debt burden in 2000 and 2008. Source: Household Budget Surveys. The 
frequency weights used are based on sampling weights to simulate the whole population of 
households that borrow. The DB is censored at the value of 30, and the ADB is censored at the value 
of 50. Kernel densities are based on the Epanechnikov weighting function and the “optimal” 
bandwidth that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian and a 
Gaussian kernel was used (STATA default option).  18   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
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d) 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. 
 
We next disaggregate the average debt burden of households by number of loans, income, 
education, and age. It is rather obvious that the debt burden is an increasing function of the 
number of types of loans a household has. The burden of households with one loan type was 
around 5% in 2000 and rose further to 8% in 2008 (see Figure 3.13a). The debt burden of 
households with two types of loans was 8% in 2000 and increased to twice as much in 2008. 
Households with all three loan types had an average debt burden of 13% in 2000, which also 
gradually increased, reaching 20% in 2008.  
The distribution of the debt burden across the five income quintiles shows that until 2006 it was 
the lowest income group that had the highest debt burden among all income groups (see Figure 
3.13b). However, starting from 2005, the debt burden increased mainly among households in the 
highest income group. However, there was an overall increase in the average debt burden across 
all income groups as credit gradually became accessible to all of them. 
Furthermore, we look at the distribution of the debt burden across three levels of education: 1 – 
basic education, 2 – high school education, and 3 – university education. The debt burden is an 
increasing function of education level (see Figure 3.13c). While the lowest education group had 
an average debt burden of 6% in 2002, the figure had risen to 11% by 2008. Households with a 
medium education level had an average debt burden equal to 7% in 2000, increasing to 11.5% in 
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debt burden of the medium education group, namely 7%, but it subsequently rose, reaching 13% 
in 2008. Although the differences in the debt burden across education levels are small, it is still 
clear that the highest average debt burden is concentrated in the segment of the most educated 
households.  
We also document the differences in debt burden across four age groups: 1 – households younger 
than 38, 2 – households younger than 51, 3 – households younger than 60, and 4 – households 
older than 59. The highest debt burden is concentrated among the youngest population (see 
Figure 3.13d), with an average debt burden of just over 15%. The debt burden in the remaining 
three age groups evolved in a similar manner, reaching 12% in 2008. The distribution of the ADB 
across the four different household characteristics (not presented) is fairly similar to that of the 
DB.  
4. Who Borrows? 
We next use HBS data to analyze the key determinants of the observed household borrowing 
patterns described in the previous section. In particular, we estimate probit models of the 
probability that a household has a loan and that a household takes out a new loan in a given year, 
and tobit models of the size of the total new loans taken out in a given year and of a household’s 
debt burden. All models are estimated on pooled annual data over the period 2000–2008 with 
year and regional effects included. 
4.1 Model Specification 
We considered all information available in our data for the estimation and, based on both their 
economic and statistical importance, eventually selected a subset of variables, which are listed 
and defined in Table 4.1. The choice and meaning of most of the variables are straightforward, 
but two of them deserve further discussion. We use and interpret the variable Games-Lottery 
(whether a household has expenditures on games and lottery) as a proxy for risk-loving, and the 
variable Private pension plan (whether a household saves for retirement via a private pension 
plan
13 to complement the public pension) as a proxy for financial literacy.
14 
 In our models of the probability of taking out a new loan and of the size of the new loan granted, 
we also include a variable containing information on whether a household has an existing loan in 
order to explore loan accumulation. We then ask how and whether the extent of loan 
accumulation changed once information-sharing existed in the market. We construct a variable 
CBCB, which indicates the presence of a credit bureau in the market, as follows: CB equals 0 for 
the years 2000–2003 and equals 1 for the remaining periods, starting with 2004.
15 We include this 
                                                           
13 This is basically a non-mandatory private defined-contribution retirement saving scheme. 
14 While expenditure on games and saving in a private pension plan may also signal households’ financial 
reserves and lower risk exposure, we still regard these two rather distinct items as reasonably good proxies for 
attitude to risk and financial management ability, respectively. 
15 Following the establishment of the Czech Banking Credit Bureau  (CBCB) in 2000, information-sharing came 
into use by five major banks operating in the Czech credit market in the middle of 2003. We expect that it took 
banks at least 6 months to adjust their strategies and evaluation of loan applications to include additional 
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variable interacted with the information on whether a household has an existing loan in order to 
explore the effect of information-sharing on the rate of loan accumulation.
16  
Table 4.1: List of Variables Used in the Estimation 
Variable name  Variable description 
Year: 2000-2008  Year dummy variables; base category is year 2000 
Region1-Region14   Region effects based on region where household resides (not presented) 
Town, Village  Degree of urbanization: town, village, or city (base category) 
Incquint1-Incquint5  Indicators of quintile in which household’s income belongs. Quintiles are 
calculated for each year separately. Base category is lowest quintile, 
Incquint1. 
Has other income  Dummy variable that household had unexpected or rare income in given 
year  
Age  Age of head of household in years; base less than 37 
High School, University  Highest education level achieved in household: basic education (base 
category), high school, and university 
Mrg  Duration of marriage (in years), base category is less than 17 years or not 
married 
Has child  Dummy that there is dependent child in household 
Alone  Dummy that there is just one person in household 




Type of employment: employer, self-employed, employee in public sector, 
retired, housewife, no job, employee in private firm (base category) 
Home owner  Dummy that household lives in its own property 
Games-Lottery  Dummy that household spends money on hazard games and lottery 




Dummy that household has existing loan when it receives new one (in 
regressions for new loan occurrence and new loan size) 
CBCB  Binary indicator of whether credit bureau exists in given year (starting 
2004).  
ConsLoan  Dummy that household has consumer loan 
HouseLoan  Dummy that household has housing loan 
OthLoan  Dummy that household has other loan 
 
4.2 Determinants of Borrowing  
The average marginal effects from the probit model of the probability that the household has at 
least one loan, regardless of the type of loan, are reported in Table 4.2. Consistent with the 
descriptive statistics from the previous section, which showed that the share of households 
remained stable, the time trend does not influence the probability that a household borrows in the 
credit market. The probability of having a loan increases with income, the size of the household, 
and the presence of children, but decreases with age and the duration of marriage. Household 
income and age are the biggest determinants of borrowing in terms of magnitude. Households 
with more educated members are less likely to borrow. Households with members who are 
employers or self-employed are less likely to be granted a loan, while employees in the public 
                                                           
16 Note that we cannot include this variable in our models of the probability of having a new loan and of the size 
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sector are more likely to be granted a loan, as compared to the basic (omitted) category, namely, 
employees in the private sector. We conjecture that this is mostly driven by restrictions on the 
supply side, as employers and the self-employed represent higher risk and uncertainty (due to 
greater income volatility and inability to prove true income), whereas the stability of public 
employees’ jobs serves as a signal reducing the risk of default when compared to private 
employees, making credit-granting institutions reluctant to grant loans to the former and more 
prone to grant loans to the latter. In line with our expectations, both risk aversion and financial 
literacy increase the probability that the household has a loan.  
Table 4.2: Probability of Having a Loan 
Variable   AME  St.err.  Variable   AME  St.err. 
2001 0.00269  (0.0350)  High  school  -0.0773***  (0.0213) 
2002 -0.0177  (0.0351)  University  -0.0982***  (0.0307) 
2003 -0.00953  (0.0359)  mrg>17  &  mrg<=25  -0.177***  (0.0311) 
2004 -0.00722  (0.0356)  mrg>25  &  mrg<=35  -0.296***  (0.0340) 
2005 -0.00218  (0.0358)  mrg>35 -0.437***  (0.0444) 
2006 0.0514  (0.0362)  Haschild  0.0737**  (0.0335) 
2007 0.0517  (0.0363)  Alone  -0.195***  (0.0392) 
2008 0.0260  (0.0368)  Member  0.0520***  (0.0155) 
Village 0.0106  (0.0283)  Employer -0.302***  (0.0570) 
Town 0.0228  (0.0265)  Pubemployee  0.0881***  (0.0203) 
Incquint2 0.163***  (0.0414)  Selfemployed  -0.202***  (0.0252) 
Incquint3 0.345***  (0.0460)  Retired  0.0186  (0.0373) 
Incquint4 0.495***  (0.0492)  Housewife  -0.0331  (0.0324) 
Incquint5 0.569***  (0.0535)  Nojob_other -0.0998**  (0.0470) 
Hasotherinc 0.162***  (0.0184)  Homeowner  0.0529***  (0.0195) 
age>37 & age<=50  -0.262***  (0.0251)  Games-Lottery  0.109***  (0.0182) 
age>50 & age<=59  -0.451***  (0.0313)  Private pension plan  0.155***  (0.0184) 
age>59 -0.747***  (0.0449)  Constant  -0.700***  (0.0691) 
Note: Average marginal effects (AME) and standard errors from the probit model of the probability of 
having a loan. Pooled data for 2000–2008. Regional dummies are included; Prague is the base 
category. Pseudo R2 is 0.14. The base category is represented by households with private 
employees, income in the lowest quintile, basic education, age below 37, and duration of marriage 
below 17 years, who reside in a city, in the year 2000. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from our second regression, a probit model of the probability that a household takes 
out a new loan in a given year, given in Table 4.3, are fairly close to the previous model, 
suggesting that the probabilities of having a loan and of taking out a new one are determined by 
similar factors in a similar way.  
The only difference is the opposite sign of home ownership in the two models. As will be 
discussed later, this is due to the fact that home owners finance the purchase of their home via 
mortgages, which increases their probability of having a loan, but, as they already have a loan to 
repay, they are less likely to take out another loan.  
There are, however, two additional variables in the model of the probability of taking out a new 
loan, as compared to the model of the occurrence of an existing loan: information on whether a 22   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
household has an existing loan, and its interaction with the indicator for the existence of 
information-sharing.  
Table 4.3: Probability of Taking out a New Loan (with an Old Loan and Information-Sharing) 
Variable   AME  St.err.  Variable  AME  St.err. 
2001  -0.0933**  (0.0419)  age>59  -0.512***  (0.0590) 
2002  -0.122***  (0.0422)  high school  -0.0364  (0.0262) 
2003  -0.146***  (0.0435)  University  -0.113***  (0.0380) 
2004  -0.110**  (0.0455)  mrg>17 & mrg<=25  -0.0697*  (0.0377) 
2005  -0.138***  (0.0458)  mrg>25 & mrg<=35  -0.205***  (0.0441) 
2006  -0.105**  (0.0463)  mrg>35  -0.298***  (0.0600) 
2007  -0.112**  (0.0465)  Haschild  0.00217  (0.0404) 
2008  -0.206***  (0.0481)  Alone  -0.128***  (0.0491) 
Village  -0.126***  (0.0335)  Member  0.0628***  (0.0180) 
Town  -0.136***  (0.0311)  Employer  -0.419***  (0.0817) 
incquint2  0.0170  (0.0530)  Pubemployee  -0.00751  (0.0245) 
incquint3  0.0635  (0.0584)  Selfemployed  -0.244***  (0.0326) 
incquint4  0.111*  (0.0620)  Retired  0.0710  (0.0486) 
incquint5  0.148**  (0.0667)  Housewife  0.0255  (0.0370) 
Hasotherinc  0.264***  (0.0223)  nojob_other  -0.0521  (0.0564) 
Oldloan  0.0394  (0.0321)  Homeowner  -0.0858***  (0.0233) 
Oldloan*CBCB  0.120***  (0.0424)  Games-Lottery  0.120***  (0.0219) 
age>37 & age<=50  -0.203***  (0.0295)  Private Pension Plan  0.0942***  (0.0226) 
age>50 & age<=59  -0.278***  (0.0388)  Constant  -1.291***  (0.0856) 
Note: Average marginal effects (AME) and standard errors from the probit model of the probability of 
taking out a new loan in a given year. Pooled data for 2000–2008. Regional dummies are included; 
Prague is the base category. Pseudo R2 is 0.09. The base category is represented by households with 
private employees, income in the lowest quintile, basic education, age below 37, and duration of 
marriage below 17 years, who reside in a city, in the year 2000. CBCB captures the existence and 
use of the credit bureau and is defined as zero for 2000–2003 and one for 2004–2008. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While the average marginal effect of having an existing loan on the probability of taking out a 
new loan is positive but insignificant, it is 0.12 and significant at 1% when interacted with the 
indicator of the presence of the credit bureau. This means that having an existing loan increases 
the probability of taking out a new loan by 12 p.p., but only when there is information-sharing in 
the market. We conclude that the observed loan accumulation was mostly driven by credit-
granting institutions: as access to information about households’ credit histories reduced the 
uncertainty about their repayment ability and behavior, credit-granting institutions were more 
likely to grant new loans to these households.    Who Borrows and Who May Not Repay?   23 
 
 
Table 4.4: Model of the Size of Total New Loans 
Variable   AME  St.err.  Variable   AME  St.err. 
2001  -0.212*  (0.108)  high school  -0.0682  (0.0675) 
2002  -0.256**  (0.109)  University  -0.181*  (0.0966) 
2003  -0.270**  (0.112)  mrg>17 & mrg<=25  -0.181*  (0.0960) 
2004  -0.0415  (0.109)  mrg>25 & mrg<=35  -0.535***  (0.113) 
2005  -0.0446  (0.110)  mrg>35  -0.721***  (0.156) 
2006  0.0827  (0.110)  Haschild  0.0708  (0.103) 
2007  0.261**  (0.110)  Alone  -0.291**  (0.126) 
2008  -0.107  (0.114)  Member  0.0899**  (0.0456) 
Village  -0.292***  (0.0850)  Employer  -0.899***  (0.207) 
Town  -0.329***  (0.0791)  Pubemployee  -0.0208  (0.0621) 
incquint2  0.134  (0.138)  Selfemployed  -0.597***  (0.0833) 
incquint3  0.311**  (0.151)  Retired  0.127  (0.126) 
incquint4  0.526***  (0.159)  Housewife  0.105  (0.0929) 
incquint5  0.777***  (0.171)  nojob_other  -0.216  (0.145) 
Hasotherinc  0.561***  (0.0572)  Homeowner  -0.158***  (0.0593) 
age>37 & age<=50  -0.611***  (0.0749)  Games-Lottery  0.299***  (0.0558) 
age>50 & age<=59  -0.822***  (0.0992)  Private pension plan  0.211***  (0.0576) 
age>59  -1.346***  (0.153)  Constant  -3.647***  (0.224) 
Note: Average marginal effects (AME) and standard errors for the intensive margin (among households 
that borrow) from the tobit model of the total amount of new loans taken out in a given year. Pooled 
data for 2000–2008. Regional dummies are included; Prague is the base category. Pseudo R2 is 0.06. 
The base category is represented by households with private employees, income in the lowest 
quintile, basic education, age below 37, and duration of marriage below 17 years, who reside in a 
city, in the year 2000. Loan size is in CZK 100,000. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Third, we estimate a tobit model of the amount of all new loans taken out in a given year. Table 
4.4 presents the results in terms of the average marginal effects for the intensive margin, i.e., the 
effects of the variables on the size of total new loans taken out in a given year, conditional on at 
least one new loan being taken out in a given year. The results are in line with our findings for the 
probabilities of having a loan and of having a new loan in a given year. This suggests that the 
frequency (in terms of households with a loan) and intensity (in terms of the loan sizes) are 
determined by similar factors. We can see that households in towns and villages have smaller 
amounts of total new loans granted in a given year compared to households in cities. This is most 
probably driven by rural versus urban differences in housing and other prices as well as 
differences in household income. Younger households have higher amounts of total new loans. 
We conjecture that this result is mostly demand driven, as such households have current housing 
needs for starting families and also have the longest consumption-smoothing horizon. Employers 
and self-employed households not only have a smaller probability of having a loan and of being 
granted a new one, but also take out and are granted smaller loan amounts than employees. We 
again conjecture that this is driven by a limited supply of credit, as banks use tax returns when 
granting loans and entrepreneurs typically optimize their income across years in order to pay 
lower taxes, which may undervalue their true ability to repay in banks’ eyes. Finally, as expected, 
households with lower risk aversion and higher financial literacy tend to borrow greater amounts. 
Like the positive effect of having an existing loan on the probability of taking out a new one, the 
fact that a household already has a loan increases the amount of new loans, but again only once 24   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
the credit bureau is in effect. Starting in 2004, having an existing loan increases the amount of 
new loans taken out, conditional on a new loan being taken out, by CZK 24,700, but it has no 
effect prior to that year. 
Table 4.4: Model of the Size of Total New Loans (with an Old Loan and Information-Sharing) 
Variable   AME  St.err.  Variable   AME  St.err. 
2001 -0.212*  (0.108)  age>59  -1.314***  (0.153) 
2002 -0.256**  (0.109)  high  school  -0.0628  (0.0676) 
2003 -0.270**  (0.112)  University  -0.178*  (0.0967) 
2004 -0.140  (0.117)  mrg>17  &  mrg<=25  -0.176*  (0.0962) 
2005 -0.141  (0.118)  mrg>25  &  mrg<=35  -0.521***  (0.114) 
2006 -0.0197  (0.118)  mrg>35  -0.694***  (0.156) 
2007 0.159  (0.118)  Haschild  0.0668  (0.103) 
2008 -0.215*  (0.123)  Alone  -0.280**  (0.126) 
Village -0.300***  (0.0852)  Member 0.0919**  (0.0457) 
Town -0.335***  (0.0792)  Employer  -0.893***  (0.207) 
incquint2 0.126  (0.138)  Pubemployee  -0.0249  (0.0622) 
incquint3 0.291*  (0.151)  Selfemployed  -0.592***  (0.0835) 
incquint4 0.497***  (0.160)  Retired  0.120  (0.126) 
incquint5 0.742***  (0.172)  Housewife  0.104  (0.0930) 
hasotherinc 0.558***  (0.0573)  nojob_other -0.208  (0.145) 
Oldloan 0.00991  (0.0827)  Homeowner  -0.169***  (0.0594) 
oldloan*CBCB 0.247**  (0.108)  Games  lottery  0.298***  (0.0559) 
age>37 & age<=50  -0.600***  (0.0751)  pension insurance  0.201***  (0.0578) 
age>50 & age<=59  -0.800***  (0.0996)  Constant  -3.625***  (0.225) 
Note: Average marginal effects for the intensive margin (among households that borrow) from the tobit 
model of the total amount of new loans taken out in a given year. Pooled data for 2000–2008. 
Regional dummies are included. Pseudo R2 is 0.06. The base category is represented by households 
with private employees, income in the lowest quintile, basic education, age below 37, and duration 
of marriage below 17 years, who reside in a city, in 2000. CBCB captures the existence and use of 
the credit bureau and is defined as zero for 2000–2003 and one for 2004–2008. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Information-sharing allows credit-granting institutions to differentiate among households based 
on their past borrowing and repayment behavior and therefore grant households with good credit 
histories higher limits on the amounts of new loans compared to households with bad or no credit 
history. Given our results, shared information about an existing loan – at the early stage of 
development of the credit market and still relatively low levels of debt – apparently served as a 
positive signal of clients’ experience with borrowing. While in this sense the CBCB also 
contributed to loan accumulation, we expect that with further expansion of credit, it will also 
serve as an indicator of overindebtedness and prevent lending institutions from extending credit 
to households with too much credit relative to their repayment ability. We analyze the evolution 
of the debt burden and its distribution among households that borrow in the next section.  
4.3. Determinants of the Debt Burden 
The average marginal effects from the tobit model of the debt burden are presented in Table 4.5. 
In line with the descriptive section, the yearly fixed effects suggest that the debt burden has been 
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does not significantly differ with the degree of urbanization. We interpret this as being a result of 
the fact that the levels of debt, income, and costs differ across urban locations in a similar way, so 
that the ratio of loan repayments to income stays the same. Similar to the estimation results for 
the patterns of borrowing, the debt burden is higher among high-income groups, the younger 
population, and couples with a lower duration of marriage. Single-member households have a 
lower debt burden. Employers and the self-employed have a lower debt burden than employees, 
and both risk-loving and financial literacy also foster more debt accumulation.  
Table 4.5: Debt Burden Model  
Variable   Beta  St.err.  Variable   Beta  St.err. 
2001 0.0918  (0.592)  high  school  -1.045***  (0.361) 
2002 0.125  (0.593)  University  -0.591  (0.512) 
2003 0.943  (0.605)  mrg>17  &  mrg<=25  -2.839***  (0.514) 
2004 1.675***  (0.598)  mrg>25  &  mrg<=35  -4.819***  (0.586) 
2005 2.394***  (0.600)  mrg>35  -6.739***  (0.794) 
2006 2.677***  (0.606)  Haschild  0.00963  (0.557) 
2007 3.093***  (0.608)  Alone -3.560***  (0.670) 
2008 3.195***  (0.616)  Member  0.0438  (0.252) 
Village 0.315  (0.470)  Employer  -3.063***  (0.966) 
Town 0.149  (0.440)  Pubemployee  0.675**  (0.335) 
incquint2 2.568***  (0.733)  Selfemployed  -2.558***  (0.423) 
incquint3 5.420***  (0.803)  Retired  -0.288  (0.650) 
incquint4 7.578***  (0.852)  Housewife  1.321**  (0.516) 
incquint5 9.105***  (0.919)  nojob_other  -1.246  (0.788) 
Hasotherinc 1.856***  (0.307)  Homeowner  1.570***  (0.326) 
age>37 & age<=50  -4.698***  (0.407)  Games lottery  1.737***  (0.303) 
age>50 & age<=59  -7.619***  (0.530)  pension insurance  2.078***  (0.309) 
age>59 -13.75***  (0.786)  Constant  -13.35***  (1.188) 
Note: Average marginal effects for the intensive margin (among households that borrow) from the tobit 
model of households’ debt burden, defined as the ratio of loan repayments to net income. Pooled 
data for 2000–2008. Regional dummies are included. Pseudo R2 is 0.04. The base category is 
represented by households with private employees, income in the lowest quintile, basic education, 
age below 37, and duration of marriage below 17 years, who reside in a city, in 2000. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note that homeowners have a higher debt burden than non-homeowners, which again suggests 
that most of them used a mortgage to finance their home purchase.  
We next analyze which type of loan contributed the most to the increase in the debt burden by 
augmenting the model in Table 4.5 with a series of interaction terms of year fixed effects and 
three indicators of the types of loans a household may have. In Table 4.6 we report just the 
average marginal effects of the interaction terms and their components. The effects of the 
remaining variables remain practically unchanged when compared with the results in Table 4.5. 
In line with the observed stable share of households that borrow but the rapidly changing 
composition of the types of loans households obtain, year fixed effects are not significantly 
different from zero and the evolution of the debt burden overtime is mostly explained by changes 26   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
in the use of the different types of loans. While consumer loans formed the largest part of the debt 
burden in 2000, followed by housing loans and other loans, this pattern reversed over the 
analyzed period. Expansion of housing loans (starting in 2005, but in particularly in 2007) was 
the main source of the increase of the debt burden, complemented by other loans, while the 
contribution of consumer loans decreased over time. The results for the model of the ADB (not 
presented here) are fairly close to the results for the DB. 
Table 4.6: Debt Burden Model 
Variable   Margins  St.err.  Variable   Margins  St.err. 
2001 -0.440  (0.873)  Consloan  20.34***  (0.755) 
2002 0.139  (0.860)  consloan*2001  0.579  (1.047) 
2003 -0.507  (0.890)  consloan*2002  -0.743  (1.057) 
2004 1.049  (0.859)  consloan*2003  -0.409  (1.087) 
2005 1.337  (0.857)  consloan*2004  -1.619  (1.071) 
2006 1.247  (0.871)  consloan*2005  -2.264**  (1.080) 
2007 0.782  (0.885)  consloan*2006  -2.552**  (1.086) 
2008 0.994  (0.886)  consloan*2007  -2.513**  (1.104) 
Houseloan 19.03***  (0.824)  consloan*2008  -3.519***  (1.122) 
houseloan*2001 0.872  (1.144)  Othloan  10.63***  (0.827) 
houseloan*2002 1.211  (1.134)  othloan*2001  1.810  (1.206) 
houseloan*2003 2.586**  (1.156)  othloan*2002  2.361**  (1.160) 
houseloan*2004 0.581  (1.126)  othloan*2003  5.769***  (1.167) 
houseloan*2005 3.918***  (1.128)  othloan*2004  6.193***  (1.149) 
houseloan*2006 2.738**  (1.130)  othloan*2005  5.870***  (1.152) 
houseloan*2007 5.454***  (1.129)  othloan*2006  6.542***  (1.154) 
houseloan*2008 5.527***  (1.129)  othloan*2007  6.506***  (1.165) 
     othloan*2008  7.109***  (1.181) 
Note: Average marginal effects for the intensive margin (among households that borrow) from the tobit 
model of households’ debt burden, defined as the ratio of loan repayments to net income. The 
specification of the tobit model is as in Table 4.7, but augmented with three types of loan and their 
interactions with year dummies (only the effects of these additional variables are reported in the 
table), in order to explore the contribution of each type of loan to debt accumulation. Pooled data for 
2000–2008. Pseudo R2 is 0.14. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
5. Who May Not Repay? 
5.1 SILC Data and Trends in Repayment Difficulties 
Until now, we have explored our principal dataset (the HBS) in order to determine which 
households borrow, how much they borrow, and to what extent they accumulate loans relative to 
income, as the main indicator of their repayment ability. As the HBS does not contain any 
information about households’ repayment behavior, financial difficulties or default, we have not 
been able to assess whether households borrow above their repayment limits, what level of 
indebtedness relative to income is likely to lead to default, and whether the observed borrowing 
patterns create threats to financial stability.  
We will now use an additional dataset which contains information about households’ repayment 
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“Statistics on Income and Living Conditions” (SILC), which is an annual survey collected again 
by the Czech Statistical Office, available for the period 2005–2008.
17 The aim of the survey was 
to gather representative data on income distribution and the quality and affordability of housing, 
but it also contains a series of other socio-economic characteristics, including information about 
households’ delayed payments (of electricity, gas, and cell phone bills, of rent, and of mortgage 
and other loan repayments) and households’ perception of their financial situation. Unfortunately, 
the dataset lacks some of the crucial economic variables that are present in the HBS, in particular 
the amount of annual repayments of loans and the amount of total new loans in a given year. 






Note:   Weighted by sampling weights.* Share of households that missed at least one loan repayment in 
the given year among all households that have a loan. 
Source: SILC 2005–2008. 
 
In order to analyze repayment behavior, we restrict our sample to households that have a loan, 
i.e., households that report that they are repaying a mortgage or another loan in a given year. The 
share of households with a loan, the size of the sample of households with a loan, and their 
repayment behavior are summarized in Table 5.1. Note that repayment behavior is captured by 
information about any delayed payments on a loan,
18 i.e., whether the household failed to repay at 
least one loan installment on time. It is this information which we use as a – rather broad – 
definition of default in this paper.  
Households’ perceptions of getting by are displayed in Figure 5.2. In line with the decreasing rate 
of delayed payments, households’ subjective assessment of their financial situation, reported in 
Figure 5.2. suggests that their cash flow management improved over the analyzed time period. 
The percentage of households with any delayed payments on their loans in the given year 
decreases substantially over time, starting at almost 11% in 2005 and reaching about 5% in 2008. 
We conjecture that the decrease in the share of households that miss their repayments is driven 
mostly by two factors: first, the relatively strong economic growth over the analyzed period, and 
second, a gradual improvement in lenders’ credit-scoring techniques, which help avoid loans 
being granted to risky households. 
                                                           
17 Note that the few occurrences of non-response are dealt with by the CZSO by imputation methods based on 
standard statistical procedures.  
18 Unfortunately, the number of delayed payments and the length of delay are not reported in the data. 
Year  HH with a loan %*  Sample size (HH 
with a loan) 
Delayedpay %* 
2005 28.44%  1,159  10.89% 
2006 29.24%  2,015  9.16% 
2007 27.30%  2,454  5.90% 
2008 27.93%  2,872  4.92% 28   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
Figure 5.2: Households’ Subjective Assessment of Their Financial Situation 
Note:   Sample contains households with a loan. Weighted by sampling weights. 
Source: SILC 2005–2008. 
5.2 Combining Repayment Behavior with Imputed Debt Burden Levels 
We next try to relate the extent of households’ indebtedness, as captured by the debt burden, to 
their repayment behavior. As already mentioned, while the HBS dataset, which we use to analyze 
households’ debt burden ratios, lacks information on repayment behavior, the SILC dataset has 
both household income and repayment behavior indicators, as summarized in the previous 
subsection, but has no information about the amount of loan repayments a household has to make. 
Table 5.3: Variables Used in the Prediction of the Amount of Loan Repayments 
Variable name  Variable description 
paid_this_year  Amount of loans repaid this year 
year Year  dummy;  base  2000 
region  Region dummy; base Prague 
houseloan  Dummy that HH has a house loan 
type of flat  Flat type categories; base rental 
HH type  Household categories; base couple without children 
soc subsidy  Dummy that HH gets social subsidies 
room nbr  Number of rooms HH flat has 
meters 2  Surface area of flat 
income quint  Income quintile 
age  Age of head of HH 
educ  Education level of HH; base basic 
marriage age  Length of marriage of HH 
marriage age2   Length of marriage of HH squared 
public employ  Member of HH works for public sector 
Retired  Member of HH is pensioner 





















Getting by Getting by
Getting by Getting by
with great difficulties with difficulties
with small difficulties fairly
easily very easily




In order to explore the relationship between the debt burden and default, we need to combine the 
information from the two datasets. We choose to use the HBS dataset to predict the total annual 
loan repayments in the SILC data, where this information is missing. We first estimate a model of 
annual loan repayments using the HBS data and – based on our estimates – we then predict the 
annual loan repayments of households in the SILC dataset. For the purposes of this extrapolation, 
we use a linear regression model estimated only on households that have a loan in the given 
year.
19 As our goal is to achieve the best fit, we use all the variables which could have any 
predictive power for the amount of loan repayments in a given year and which are common to 




In Figure 5.4, we compare the real values of the amount of loan repayments in the given year 
from the HBS (left) and the values of the annual amount of loan repayments predicted in the 
SILC dataset (right). We see that because our preferred estimation technique does not account for 
bottom truncation of loan repayments at zero, low values of loan repayments are overestimated in 
our predictions. 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of the Amount of Loan Repayments – Observed in the HBS and 
Predicted in the SILC 
HBS   SILC predicted 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. Censored at CZK 100,000. 
 
5.3 DB and ADB as Predictors of Default 
Once we have the predicted annual amount of loan repayments of households in the SILC data, 
we calculate their DB and ADB and explore whether these measures correlate with their 
repayment behavior. In order to explore the relationship between our two debt burden measures 
and default, we divide households into 20 uniform groups with respect to their standard debt 
burden (SDB) and adjusted debt burden (ADB) and report the default rates across the 20 
                                                           
19 This implies that we are using a truncated sample and our coefficients are most probably inconsistent. 
However, the tobit model on all households gave a much worse fit and we do not have any suitable exclusion 
restrictions for a two-equation model with censoring, which would be less restrictive than tobit.  
20 A scatter plot of the actual and within-sample-predicted amounts of loan repayments is presented in Table B.1 
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quantiles.
21 Figure 5.5 shows the overall relationship for the entire period 2005–2008, as well as 
for the individual years. Both the SDB and the ADB have relatively high discriminatory power 
toward the risk of default, as the default rates rise across the 20 quantiles for both definitions. 
However, the gradual increase in default rates across the 20 quantiles of the ADB measure is 
much more clear and “monotonic” than that of the SDB.  
Based on the relationship between the SDB and ADB and default, we select the most important 
cut-off points of the two measures to differentiate across default rates, i.e., the points which can 
best separate the differences in default rates across these measures. Table 5.6 reports the default 
rates (i.e., the shares of households with delayed loan payments among households that have a 
loan) within the four groups defined by the most important cut-off points. 
Inspecting the distribution of delayed payments across different SDB and ADB values, we find 
that the default rate substantially increases in the segment of households with an SDB level 
greater than 15% and with an ADB level above 31%. In the first case the default rate reaches 10% 
in 2008. In the second it is almost 15% in 2008.  
Figure 5.5: Comparison of the SDB and the ADB with Respect to the Default Rate 
  
Note: Weighted by sampling weights.   
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Table 5.6: Cut-off Points for the SDB and the ADB 
Debt  Burden  2005 2006 2007 2008 
<=7% 8.31% 6.29% 2.80% 1.79% 
<=11%  10.59%  7.53% 4.52% 2.84% 
<=15% 12.72% 11.15% 6.63%  4.08% 
>15%  12.44% 15.79% 10.87% 10.45% 
                       
ADB 2005 2006 2007 2008 
<=9% 4.14% 2.73% 1.79% 0.74% 
<=19%  9.82% 5.19% 3.96% 3.42% 
<=31% 11.38% 12.29% 6.62%  4.13% 
>31%  19.40% 20.74% 14.52% 14.51% 
 
Note: Default rates at different levels of the standard and adjusted debt burden measures. 
 
We see that for both the SDB and the ADB, the average default rate decreases over time in all 
four groups, with the most substantial drop being in 2007. In the group with the highest debt 
burden, however, default declines at the slowest rate. The adjusted debt burden again seems to 
separate default better than the standard debt burden. Table 5.7 explores the relationship between 
the two measures and default formally, as it shows the household-level correlations between the 
SDB or the ADB and default. We see that the correlation between the ADB and default is more or 
less twice as high as the correlation between the SDB and default in all four years. We conclude 
that the adjusted debt burden separates default better than the standard debt burden definition.  
Table 5.7: Correlations of the SDB and the ADB with Default 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
SDB 0.03  0.09**  0.13**  0.09** 
ADB  0.12** 0.19** 0.17** 0.17** 
Note: ** means significant at the 5% level. 
In addition, we propose to use an adjusted debt burden of above 30% as an indicator of 
households with too much debt relative to their repayment behavior. The corresponding default 
rate among overindebted households was 15% in 2008. We use this definition of 
overindebtedness in the remaining part of the paper. It should be emphasized, however, that this 
definition is overly cautious, as first, on average over the analyzed period only 17% of 
overindebted households did not make their loan repayments on time, and second, we expect that 
just a fraction of households with delayed payments eventually default. 
The average values of the SDB and the ADB in the SILC data over the four years are reported in 
Table 5.9. Note that the values of the debt burden (especially the ADB) using the SILC data are 
higher than our results for the HBS. This is most probably a result of using predicted loan 
repayments based on our extrapolation techniques for the SILC measures. While the average debt 
burden slightly increased over the given period, the average adjusted debt burden fluctuated, with 
two peaks in 2005 and 2007 corresponding to the boom years in the household credit market. The 
table also shows that both monthly disposable income (net of taxes) and discretionary income 
(disposable income minus the living minimum) increased over the four years.  32   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
Table 5.9: Comparison of the SDB and the ABD over Time 
Year Debt  burden 
Adjusted 




income Living  min 
2005  11.04% 31.69% 10.89% 26,438  16,632  9,852 
2006 9.86%  24.20%  9.16%  27,076  17,163  9,962 
2007  11.09% 27.37% 5.90%  29,233  19,074  10,199 
2008  12.21% 23.02% 4.92%  32,327  21,962  10,401 
Note: Weighted by sampling weights. 
As discretionary income increased more (and relative to loan repayments) than disposable income 
between 2007 and 2008, we see that while the DB increased between the two years, the ADB 
actually fell. The corresponding default rate also decreased – a rather promising trend in financial 
stability terms, but one which changed sharply in 2009 as a consequence of the 2008 global 
financial crisis (see again the aggregate developments in section 3). The micro data for these 
years, however, are not available yet. 
5.4 Loan-at-Risk Simulations  
We now use our definition of overindebtedness (see the previous subsection) in combination with 
the limited information on loans that we have in the HBS – total annual installments on all 
outstanding loans and the total amount of new loans taken out in the given period – in order to 
infer what share of the corresponding totals in the population are at risk of default.
22 We calculate 
the corresponding population totals using frequency weights. Each household’s amounts are 
multiplied by a number which captures how many households a particular household in our 
sample represents in the population.
23 Using our definition of overindebtedness, we identify 
households that are at risk of default as those whose adjusted debt burden exceeds 30%. We ask 
what share of total annual installments and what share of total new loans taken out in a given year 
belong to overindebted households. Furthermore, we use an average default rate of 17%
24 among 
overindebted households in order to determine the share of annual installments which are at risk 
of default. The results are shown in Table 5.10.  
  
                                                           
22 As described in the data section, unfortunately, we do not have the state variable with information on the total 
amount of loans a household has outstanding. 
23 We construct the frequency weights from the sampling weights, normalizing them to sum to the total of 
approximately 4 million households. 
24 This is the average default rate among overindebted households over the analyzed period 2005–2008. See 
subsection 5.3.   Who Borrows and Who May Not Repay?   33 
 
 
Table 5.10: At-Risk Shares of Annual Installments and New Loans Taken Out 
  Annual installments* (in millions of CZK or %)  New loans taken out (in millions of CZK)  
Year Total  HHs  with 
ADB>30 
% by HH with 
ADB>30 
At risk of 
default 
Total HHs  with 
ADB>30 
% by HH with 
ADB>30 
At risk of 
default 
2000 24,600 9,690  39.3%  6.69%  24,200 5,160  21.3%  3.62% 
2001 27,100 10,600  38.9%  6.62%  17,200 5,660  33.0%  5.60% 
2002 28,100 11,400  40.4%  6.87%  20,800 6,840  32.8%  5.58% 
2003 31,800 12,900  40.5%  6.88%  26,300 4,970  18.9%  3.21% 
2004 38,000 16,100  42.4%  7.21%  33,900 7,650  22.6%  3.84% 
2005 40,200 18,000  44.8%  7.62%  40,700 10,300  25.3%  4.31% 
2006 42,800 18,100  42.3%  7.19%  45,200 13,300  29.3%  4.98% 
2007 48,200 20,200  42.0%  7.13%  70,300 25,300  35.9%  6.11% 
2008 57,100 24,300  42.6%  7.25%  44,500 10,000  22.5%  3.83% 
Note: * The few prior-to-due-time debt repayments are excluded from the installment calculations. Source: 
HBS and authors’ calculations. “At risk” is defined as an adjusted debt burden exceeding 30%. 
Frequency weights based on sampling weights are used to calculate the figures for the whole 
economy. 
 
We see that the share of total annual debt service (installments) on loans of overindebted 
households is about 40% and rose slightly over the analyzed period, from 39.3% in 2000 to 
42.6% in 2008. The corresponding share of total annual installments at risk of default is about 
7%, starting at 6.7% in 2000 and reaching 7.3% in 2008. Again, to remind the reader, our 
definition of default is fairly broad, so that loans at risk should be regarded as loans at risk of 
having a missed payment in a given year. The real default rate is likely to be much lower, as only 
some of these loans will eventually default.  
While we do not have any information about the share of total existing household debt that is at 
risk, we can see that, based on our data and our simulations, about 21.3% of the total amount of 
new loans in 2000 was given to households with an adjusted debt burden exceeding 30%.
25 The 
share of total new loans that are at risk varies substantially across the nine years, first going up by 
more than 10 percentage points in 2001 and 2002 and then dropping to about 19% in 2003, when 
the credit bureau came into use by five major banks. In 2003, the share of new loans to 
overindebted households started rising again, reaching a maximum of almost 36% in 2007. In 
2008, when the financial crisis started, it fell back to 22.5%. The corresponding share of total new 
loans at risk of default ranges from 3.2% in 2003 to 6.1% in 2007. As the size of the household 
credit market has been rising, the absolute amounts of yearly debt service and of new loans have 
also increased. While risky installments more than doubled, from CZK 9.6 billion to CZK 24.3 
billion, new loans given to households at risk in 2007 (CZK 25.3 billion) were five times as high 
as in 2000 (CZK 5.2 billion), but returned to their 2005 value of CZK 10 billion in the crisis year 
2008.  
                                                           
25 Due to the already mentioned data limitations, the adjusted debt burden and the overindebtedness definition 
also include the part of installments paid in the current year on a new loan taken out in the same year. So the 
precise definition of households at risk of default is: households with an adjusted debt burden either exceeding 
30% based on existing loans or exceeding 30% after taking out a new loan and accounting for installments paid 
on the new loan in the current year.  34   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
6. Financial Stability and Regional Economic Shocks 
It has been well documented that there are substantial economic differences across regions in 
most EU countries, including the Czech Republic. It is therefore not surprising that the extent of 
borrowing, overindebtedness, and default vary geographically as well (see, for example, 
Vandone, 2007). The share of households with a loan ranged from around 25% in PHA and JHC 
to almost twice as high in ULK and MSK, the share of overindebted households ranged from 
4.3% in PAK and 4.6% in PHA and PLK to 11.3% in VYS and 16.5% in KVK, and the median 
ADB among households with a loan ranged from 10.2% in PLK to 21.1% in KVK in 2008. Two 
regions had a share of overindebted households over 10% and 4 out of 14 regions had a median 
ADB over 15% in 2008.  
Note that the low values of loan occurrence in the capital (PHA) are driven by the fact that we 
analyze all three types of loans. While PHA is the leading region in the share of households with 
a housing loan as well as with other loans, consumer loans, which turn out to be widely used in 
other regions (possibly to make up for lower levels of income), render PHA as the region with the 
lowest loan occurrence in the population. The low level of indebtedness, on the other hand, is 
driven by the substantially higher income levels in PHA than other regions, and by the fact that 
the living minimum, as already discussed, does not vary across regions and therefore does not 
take into account regional differences in prices. 
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Note: Regions: PHA – Praha (Prague), JHC – Jihočeský (South Bohemia), PLK – Plzeňský (Plzeň), JHM 
– Jihomoravský (South Moravia), LBK – Liberecký (Liberec), STC – Středočeský (Central 
Bohemia), PAK – Pardubický (Pardubice), OLK – Olomoucký (Olomouc), HKK – Kralověhradecký 
(Hradec Králové), VYS – Vysočina (Vysočina), ZLK – Zlínský (Zlín), KVK – Karlovarský 
(Karlovy Vary), ULK – Ústecký (Ústí nad Labem), MSK – Moravskoslezký (Moravia-Silesia) 
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Figure 6.1 relates borrowing and overindebtedness at the regional level in 2008.
26 It suggests that 
there is a strong positive relationship between the share of households with a loan and the share 
of households with an adjusted debt burden of above 30%, as well as between the median debt 
burden among households with a loan and the share of households with a loan. The correlations 
are 0.62 and 0.55, respectively, both significant at the 5% level. It is evident from both scatter 
plots that overindebtedness increases with size of the credit market.  
As the local household credit market is likely to be closely related to other local economic 
conditions, we next inspect the relationship between overindebtedness and key economic 
characteristics of the region. Specifically, we correlate the share of households with an ADB of 
greater than 30% to two key characteristics of the local labor markets – the unemployment rate 
and average household monthly income – across regions in 2008. While unemployment and 
overindebtedness are positively contemporaneously correlated (correlation coefficient 0.52, 
significant at the 10% level), no such correlation exists at the regional level between households’ 
overindebtedness and average monthly income in the region (possibly due to the two outlying 
regions PHA and STC, where the ADB is likely to be undervalued)
27 in 2008. A simple OLS 
regression of the share of households with an ADB of over 30% in the region on a constant 
regional unemployment rate in 2008 has an adjusted R2 of 0.27 and suggests that a 1% rise in the 
unemployment rate increases the share of overindebted households in the region by 0.9 
percentage points. We next focus on the regional variation in the default rates and its relation to 
the observed overindebtedness, again by augmenting our data with information from the SILC 
dataset. In the previous section, we combined the two datasets using extrapolation at the 
household level. Here, we use a much simpler extrapolation: we use the default rates among 
households with a loan from the SILC data aggregated by year and region and merge it with the 
HBS data with information on the DB and the ADB, also aggregated by year and region.
28 The 
results are shown in Figure 6.2.  
                                                           
26 In this section, we focus primarily on 2008, the most recent year available. The reasons are: (1) there has not 
been too much change across regions over recent years and the variation comes mostly from the cross-sectional 
dimension (across regions), (2) the 2008 data seems to be of the best quality, (3) our aim is to produce the most 
up-to-date results, and (4) we try to keep the figures easy to read. The results for previous years and for the 
values averaged over time show similar correlations as those for 2008.  
27 PHA and STC represent the capital and the region surrounding it. While income in both regions is 
substantially higher than elsewhere (except for VYS), the cost of living also exceeds the levels in other regions, 
a fact which is, however, not reflected in our cost-of-living formula, which only varies with household size. Our 
ADB definition is therefore likely to undervalue the true adjusted debt burden in these two regions. If this was 
taken into account, the negative correlation between the adjusted debt burden measures and income might be 
reestablished.  
28 Again, we use the sampling weights in aggregation. 36   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   
Figure 6.2: DB, ADB, and Default Rate among Households with a Loan in 2008 
 
Note: Regions: PHA – Praha (Prague), JHC – Jihočeský (South Bohemia), PLK – Plzeňský (Plzeň), JHM 
– Jihomoravský (South Moravia), LBK – Liberecký (Liberec), STC – Středočeský (Central 
Bohemia), PAK – Pardubický (Pardubice), OLK – Olomoucký (Olomouc), HKK – Kralověhradecký 
(Hradec Králové), VYS – Vysočina (Vysočina), ZLK – Zlínský (Zlín), KVK – Karlovarský 
(Karlovy Vary), ULK – Ústecký (Ústí nad Labem), MSK – Moravskoslezký (Moravia-Silesia) 
 
Figure 6.2 focuses solely on households that have a loan and relates the regional default rates to 
the median DB and median ADB levels in 2008. First, we see that there is also substantial 
variation in default rates across regions and that it is closely related to the regional degree of 
indebtedness. In line with our previous findings, the correlation between the median ADB and 
default is higher (0.66) than the correlation between the median DB and default (0.57), both 
significant at 5%. While the regional level regression of the median DB on default in 2008 
produces a fit of adjusted R2 = 0.27 in 2008, the adjusted R2 in the same regression using the 
median ADB is 0.39.  
Finally, we relate the regional default rates to the local economic conditions in Figure 6.3. In 
accordance with our expectations, we see that unemployment and default are positively 
correlated. Surprisingly, there is also a slight positive relationship between average income and 
default. None of the two correlations, however, is significant. It is likely that economic shocks 
mostly affect repayments of households close to the edge of their ability to service debt and 
therefore increase the default rates only in regions where there is a high share of the overindebted.  
An interesting question for assessing financial stability is whether negative economic shocks 
actually tend to hit regions with a high share of overindebted households more often than other 
regions, or, alternatively put, whether overindebted households, i.e., households with an adjusted 
debt burden exceeding 30%, tend to be concentrated in regions that are more vulnerable to 
negative economic shocks. In order to answer this question, we conduct the following exercise. 
We correlate the share of overindebted households (with a debt burden above 30%) in the 
population in 2008 and the unexpected shock that followed the year afterwards in the form of the 
global financial crisis. As the main consequences of the crisis were felt in the Czech Republic 
during 2009, we calculate the size of the shock at the regional level as the percentage point 
difference between the regional unemployment rate in the last quarter of 2009 and that in the last 
quarter of 2008. The results are shown in Figure 6.4. The bad news for financial stability is that   Who Borrows and Who May Not Repay?   37 
 
 
the extent of overindebtedness is indeed somewhat positively correlated with economic 
vulnerability across regions, suggesting that regions with a higher average share of overindebted 
households in 2008 were hit harder by the negative consequences of the financial crisis in 2009 
than other regions. The correlation coefficient is 0.43, significant at the 15% level.  
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Note: Regions: PHA – Praha (Prague), JHC – Jihočeský (South Bohemia), PLK – Plzeňský (Plzeň), JHM 
– Jihomoravský (South Moravia), LBK – Liberecký (Liberec), STC – Středočeský (Central 
Bohemia), PAK – Pardubický (Pardubice), OLK – Olomoucký (Olomouc), HKK – Kralověhradecký 
(Hradec Králové), VYS – Vysočina (Vysočina), ZLK – Zlínský (Zlín), KVK – Karlovarský 
(Karlovy Vary), ULK – Ústecký (Ústí nad Labem), MSK – Moravskoslezký (Moravia-Silesia) 
 
One might question to what extent the relationship between overindebtedness and future shock 
vulnerability that we have just presented is due to possible serial correlation in shocks and the 
fact that past economic shocks lead to overindebtedness through job losses and reduction in 
income.
29 We discussed the strong link between the past (and current) negative economic 
situation and excessive borrowing above when presenting the strong positive correlation between 
the current unemployment rate and the current extent of overindebtedness of 0.77 in 2008. 
However, the correlation between the 2008 unemployment rate and the future shocks defined 
above is only 0.12 and not significant even at the 20% level, suggesting that the regional variation 
in the consequences of the financial crisis was indeed rather unexpected.  
We therefore conclude that, besides the obvious impact of negative economic shocks on the debt 
burden of households, it seems also to be the case that households with too high a debt burden are 
more likely to reside in regions that are more exposed to economic shocks. From the financial 
stability policy perspective, this finding suggests that the impact of future macroeconomic 
downturns on the default rate of households may be stronger than if the shocks were distributed 
evenly across regions.  
                                                           
29 A reduction in income possibly affects both parts of the debt burden ratio, by directly decreasing the 
denominator and indirectly increasing the numerator if less income increases demand for loans and provided 
that households are granted these additional loans. 38   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
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Note: Regions: PHA – Praha (Prague), JHC – Jihočeský (South Bohemia), PLK – Plzeňský (Plzeň), JHM 
– Jihomoravský (South Moravia), LBK – Liberecký (Liberec), STC – Středočeský (Central 
Bohemia), PAK – Pardubický (Pardubice), OLK – Olomoucký (Olomouc), HKK – Kralověhradecký 
(Hradec Králové), VYS – Vysočina (Vysočina), ZLK – Zlínský (Zlín), KVK – Karlovarský 
(Karlovy Vary), ULK – Ústecký (Ústí nad Labem), MSK – Moravskoslezký (Moravia-Silesia) 
 
7. Conclusion 
Loan growth is typically regarded as one of the early signals of financial tension. Household debt 
– and especially housing loans – contributed significantly to the growth of total loans over the last 
several years in the Czech Republic. The recent financial crisis has also highlighted the 
importance of understanding how households respond to various macroeconomic shocks and how 
this reaction depends on their income, demographic characteristics, and debt burden level. While 
this paper does not estimate the household loan repayment response to macro shocks directly, it is 
one of the first papers to use household level data to identify and characterize the households that 
are the most likely to default when affected by an adverse economic event. Household 
overindebtedness can have important implications for aggregate household spending (via the 
wealth channel) as well as for the financial system (via the balance sheets of the banking sector). 
As excessive household indebtedness may represent a financial and macroeconomic risk, analysis 
of household indebtedness provides important inputs for monetary policy as well as financial 
stability.  
We have analyzed the evolution of the household credit market in the Czech Republic over the 
period 2000–2008. While the share of households that borrow remained stable and below 40%, 
the average amount of debt outstanding increased over the last decade relative to income. Credit 
growth was dominated by expansion of housing loans and also other loans, such as overdrafts, 
while the share of consumer loans among households decreased. Our analysis shows that the 
establishment of information-sharing through a credit bureau increased debt accumulation over 
the analyzed period rather than preventing it.    Who Borrows and Who May Not Repay?   39 
 
 
The debt burden – the ratio of annual loan repayments to annual net income – reached an average 
level of 10.5% among households with outstanding debt in 2008. We test the predictive power of 
the standard debt burden for default risk, where default is defined as the inability to make loan 
repayments on time. While this is a very conservative concept of default, it is the best information 
available in our data. We emphasize that all our results should be interpreted in the light of this 
broad definition. As typically only a fraction of loans with delayed payments become truly non-
performing loans, both the default risk and the default rates are considerably overstated in our 
data, and should serve rather as a signal of potential future default.  
We propose a new measure of debt burden – the so-called adjusted debt burden (ADB), which we 
define as the ratio of annual loan repayments to annual disposable income, where the latter is 
constructed as annual net income minus the living minimum corresponding to the household’s 
size and composition.  
Combining information from two data sources, we show that the adjusted debt burden is twice as 
strongly correlated with default as the standard debt burden. The default rate in the Czech 
Republic has declined since 2005, in contrast to the slightly rising standard debt burden measure, 
but in line with a similar decrease in the adjusted debt burden indicator. 
We suggest that the adjusted debt burden rather than the debt burden should be used as a measure 
of default risk. In addition, we identify a cut-off point of an adjusted debt burden of above 30% to 
be the threshold above which the risk of default sharply rises. We propose to use “ADB above the 
30% level” as the definition of overindebtedness when assessing potential threats to the financial 
stability of the household credit market. However, we acknowledge two potential drawbacks of 
our proposed measure. First, the living minimum used to calculate disposable income in the ADB 
does not vary across regions, whereas there clearly are regional differences in the cost of living in 
the Czech Republic. Second, a comparable definition of the living minimum is necessary for 
international comparisons. We leave these two issues for future research. We emphasize our 
general conclusion that the variation in the costs of living of households of different size and 
composition must be taken into account together with income when compared to the amount of 
repayments in order to assess households’ default risk. 
Based on our definition of overindebtedness, and extrapolating the HBS data to the whole 
economy, we estimate that overindebted households accounted for about 40% of repayments 
made and 33% (19%) of new loans taken out in 2007 (2008). This corresponds to about 7.3% of 
annual repayments and 6.1% (3.8%) of total new loans being at risk of default.  
Finally, as one of the first papers on the household credit market, we explore the regional 
variation in households’ borrowing and repayment behavior. We find substantial differences in 
overindebtedness and default across regions, which in turn are closely related to local economic 
conditions. We also show not only that financial stability in the whole economy is most affected 
by regions with the highest overindebtedness, but also that their contribution is likely to be 
augmented by the fact that these are also regions with a higher risk of negative economic shocks.  
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A. Living Minimum 
The living minimum we use for the calculation of discretionary income in the denominator of the 
ADB is set by the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) and is available for each household in the data. 
It varies only by household composition, and as such it is calculated as a sum of all attributes 
concerning the given household. For example, the individual components for the calculation of 
the living minimum for 2005 are given below. 
Table A.1: Living Minimum in 2005 (in CZK) 
Child: below 5   1,720 
 6–9   1,920 
 10–14   2,270 
 15 or over  2,490 
Other person  2,360 
Household: Single member  1,940 
 2 members  2,530 
 3–4 members  3,140 
 5 or more  3,520 
Source: HBS codebook. 
 
For example, in the case of a household consisting of a married couple with one child aged 4, the 
living minimum is equal to CZK 1,720 (child) + 2*CZK 2,360 (2 adults) + CZK 3,140 (household 





B. Prediction Evaluation 
Scatter plot of the observed values and fitted values of the loan amounts repaid from the HBS 
sample. The underlying regression output is available from the authors upon request. 
 
                                                           
30 Note that a substantial change in the methodology that the CZSO uses for the living minimum calculation was 
made in 2007. Previously, the CZSO had provided information on the individual level and on the household 
level. Now, it provides figures on the individual level only. As we did not have the information to reproduce the 
past values of the living minimum according to the new methodology, we instead used the old methodology to 
calculate the living minimum in 2007 and 2008 in order to preserve comparability over time, increasing the 
living minimum by 5% each year (as done by the CZSO for the years preceding 2007). 42   Alena Bičáková, Zuzana Prelcová and Renata Pašaličová 
 
   




C. Analysis of Cut-off Points for Overindebtedness 
 
Table C.1: SDB and ADB Cut-off Points for the 20 Income Quantiles 




1 3,855698  5,491145 
2 5,658011  8,265864 
3 6,477815  9,826997 
4 7,173244  11,04217 
5 7,709298  12,10995 
6 8,16185  13,11709 
7 8,666596  14,10531 
8 9,217764  15,14901 
9 9,704064  16,21622 
10 10,23463  17,30828 
11 10,80744  18,44758 
12 11,35599  19,64429 
13 11,99717  20,97653 
14 12,60664  22,51557 
15 13,26491  24,60589 
16 13,99034  27,22987 
17 14,89989  31,09706 
18 16,1423  38,50175 
19 18,24358  58,54531 
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